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Abstract 
Purpose 
This article investigates whether intermediaries reduce loss aversion in the context of a 
high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic product (tourism packages). 
Design/methodology/approach  
The study incorporates the reference-dependent model into a Multinomial Logit Model 
with Random Parameters, which controls for heterogeneity and allows representation of 
different correlation patterns between non-independent alternatives. 
Findings 
Differentiated loss aversion is found: consumers buying high-involvement non-
frequently purchased hedonic products are less loss averse when using an intermediary 
than when dealing with each provider separately and booking their services 
independently. This result can be taken as identifying consumer-based added value 
provided by the intermediaries. 
Practical implications 
Knowing the effect of an increase in their prices is crucial for tourism collective brands 
(e.g. “sun and sea”, “inland”, “green destinations”, “World Heritage destinations”). This 
is especially applicable nowadays on account of the fact that many destinations have 
lowered prices to attract tourists (although, in the future, they will have to put prices 
back up to their normal levels). The negative effect of raising prices can be absorbed 
more easily via indirect channels when compared to individual providers, as the 
influence of loss aversion is lower for the former than the latter. The key implication is 
that intermediaries can -and should- add value in competition with direct e-tailing. 
Originality/value 
Research on loss aversion in retailing has been prolific, exclusively focused on low-
involvement and frequently-purchased products without distinguishing the direct or 
indirect character of the distribution channel. However, less is known about other types 
of products such as high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic products. This 
article focuses on the latter and analyzes different patterns of loss aversion in direct and 
indirect channels. 
 
Keywords: Loss aversion; Prospect theory; High-involvement non-frequent purchases; 
Reference price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the current market, direct and indirect sales live together, and the analysis of 
multi-channel competition and their consumer behaviour differences have acquired 
especial importance in the literature (Yan and Pein, 2009; Grewal and Levy, 2009). A 
recurrent conclusion is that brick-and-mortar retailers want to beat the convenience of 
home shopping and easy access to information provided by today’s direct sales 
mechanisms; however, in order to reach this objective, these physical intermediaries 
necessarily have to add value to the product (Zhang, 2009; Mukhopadhyay et al., 2008). 
Note that this additional value -provided by the intermediaries in competition with 
direct e-tailing- can give extra satisfaction to individuals, as customer satisfaction 
depends on functional -the product itself- and performance-delivery elements -services 
provided by the retailer- (Czepiel et al., 1985). Consequently, retailers might help 
differentiate the same product sold by direct sales through the above retail services. 
According to Yan and Pein (2009), retail services can be defined as “all forms of 
demand-enhancing services (provided by the retailer), which include immediate 
customer support, presale advice, pre- and post-purchase services, in-store advertising 
and promotions, technical and shopping assistance, return service, channel assembly 
services and the overall quality of the shopping experiences”. Note that these elements 
are factors that affect the individual’s retailing decisions and are directly managed by 
the retailers (Staus, 2011). Consequently, the main thrust of brick-and-mortar retailers 
builds on their value-added services, not always available through direct channels (Yao 
and Liu, 2005). 
Because of this, consumers might be willing to pay for them because, apart from 
the uniquely enriching experiences retailers can provide (Sands et al., 2009), some of 
these services can reduce transportation and search costs (Kopalle et al., 2009). In this 
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line, it is generally reported that prices in indirect channels are higher than in direct 
channels (Brunger, 2010; Brunger and Perelli, 2009); note that, when margins in the 
latter are low, Zhang (2009) suggests that multichannel retailers can benefit from 
drawing consumers back to physical stores.  
On this account, the study of prices in retailing is a substantive issue that has 
attracted major attention, from core influences such as the effect of prices on the 
individual’s choice (Erdem et al., 2001) and satisfaction (Zielke, 2008) to more 
ancillary aspects such as using non-advertised prices as a bait to get consumers to call to 
ask for prices (Desai et al., 2010). Within the analysis of price effects, loss aversion has 
been shown to play a relevant role (Bell and Latin, 2000). Although research in this 
field has been prolific, most of it has focused on low-involvement and frequently 
purchased products (Estelami and Lehmann, 2001), without distinguishing the direct or 
indirect character of the distribution channel. Thus, when such a distinction is made and 
other types of products are considered, doubts are cast on the accumulated 
understanding of consumer price knowledge (Estelami and De Maeyer, 2004). 
Hence, the purpose of this article is to investigate whether there are different 
effects of loss aversion on direct and indirect channels, in the context of a high-
involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic product like tourism packages. In order 
to fulfil this objective, the remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: The second 
section shows the roles that distribution and price play in tourism. The third section 
covers the description of the modelling approach used to test loss aversion in the two 
alternatives -direct and indirect channels-. The fourth section shows the data, sample 
and variables used, and the fifth presents the results obtained and their discussion. 
Finally, the sixth section summarizes the conclusions. 
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2. THE ROLES OF DISTRIBUTION AND PRICES IN A HIGH-
INVOLVEMENT, NON-FREQUENTLY PURCHASED PRODUCT: THE CASE 
OF TOURISM 
2.1. Distribution in tourism 
Tourism is a strategic industry, with 12% of World GDP (Balakrishnan, 2009) 
and distribution channels play a crucial role. Tourism distribution channels can perform 
the functions of (Bastakis et al., 2004; Lubbe, 2005; Vasudavan and Standing, 1999): 
bundling and promoting tourism products; being an information broker, transferring 
information between clients and suppliers; providing mechanisms that enable 
consumers to make, confirm and pay for reservations; and advising travellers. In this 
regard, retail travel agents play a critical role in tourism (Bitner and Booms, 1982), and 
their importance still stands today (Huand et al., 2009). This is justified by their ability 
to provide personal information and advice to travellers on a continuous basis (Walle 
(1996). In fact, Tsai et al. (2008) indicate that although the volume of direct sales is 
rising, consumers still rely on travel agents to provide a human touch and professional 
services. Accordingly, there is evidence that the “Ropo effect” (“research online, 
purchase offline”) clearly applies to tourism, especially to holiday packages, where a 
number of customers are turning to the Internet for information research but going 
offline to book the product (Rose, 2009; Yu, 2008; Law and Wong, 2003; Cheyne et al., 
2005).  
Considering the direct channel’s advantages, some authors suggest that it is 
surprising that it has not completely triumphed over the indirect channel; or at least not 
at the rate one would have expected (Rose, 2009). To reinforce this trend, note that 
according to the PhoCusWright Report (2010), offline travel distribution will grow 
faster than online for the first time since the rise of online travel.  
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Why does the human touch remain so important in tourism? Trust is the key 
element (Delgado-Ballester and Hernández-Espallardo, 2008). Rose (2009) succinctly 
characterizes a holiday package as “having relatively high complexity and information 
intensity, usually connected with a relatively high price and low frequency of purchase 
and cannot be assessed prior to its consumption” and finds that trust is a determinant 
factor in the travel customer’s channel choice decision. Certainly, inseparability 
between production and consumption (through which tourists have to go to the place 
where the product is located) and intangibility (by which tourists cannot see or try what 
they are really purchasing), increases tourists’ uncertainty. The former implies that it is 
the individual -his/her own self- who has to move to enjoy the product, hence increasing 
his/her involvement in consumption; and the latter reduces the ease with which they can 
evaluate tourism services. In the same vein, heterogeneity in tourism products affects 
tourists’ perceptions of uncertainty, as it implies high variability in tourism service 
delivery, making it impossible to produce two identical products. It again raises this 
uncertainty derived from not really knowing what an individual will find during his/her 
stay. Therefore, in order to reduce uncertainty derived from inseparability, intangibility 
and heterogeneity, an individual may rely on the “human face of a retailer”. In this 
context, the “high touch” facet (Naisbitt, 2001) can offer travel agents an unbeatable 
competitive edge not only through this reduction in uncertainty but also by providing a 
one-to-one, face-to-face, personal approach and gathering and organizing customized 
information unique to the individual’s travel needs (Kim et al., 2007). Evidently, on 
account of these advantages and the whole reduction in uncertainty, consumers should 
be prepare to assume some additional cost (Brunger, 2010; Brunger and Perelli, 2009), 
which leads us to the role of prices in tourism. 
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2.2. Prices in tourism 
When designing tourism packages, intermediaries must pay special attention to 
the price as it is the most important of all the cognitive components of the decision 
process (Sánchez et al., 2006); this is especially relevant -as outlined below- if we 
consider the high-involvement, non-frequent and hedonic character of holiday packages. 
Prices are often considered to be an indication of quality, and attitudes to prices 
can also be related to the amount of risk the buyer feels is involved in the purchase 
decision: a person may be willing to pay a higher price to feel safer and to be sure of 
what s/he will obtain. Note that prior to the consumption, for the case of experience 
goods, the individual forms expectations about the forthcoming experience using a 
number of intrinsic and extrinsic cues that give indication about the likely performance 
standards (Gould-Williams, 1999). In this regard, the epitome of experience goods is 
tourism, where information asymmetries play a crucial role for the individual when 
making his/her decisions (remember that it is the individual -his/her own person- who 
has to move to reach the product). The uncertainty inherent in the purchase and 
consumption of tourism services makes the strategies developed to reduce information 
asymmetries critical (one just has to consider that people cannot observe the product 
attributes prior to the service encounter). Thus, in order to reduce the uncertainty 
derived from the characteristics of this experience good, an individual may rely on 
prices. In fact, according to Assael (1995), the individual’s interest and level of 
involvement in a product determine the extent s/he meaningfully absorbs the 
information on prices and, clearly, this statement strongly applies to tourism 
consumption in which the individual is actively involved. 
Also, it is important to consider the psychological aspect of tourist prices: they 
may be a symbol of status as well as value. In this respect, although literature holds that 
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demand for tourism products and tourist activities is that of ordinary goods, in such a 
way that price increments diminish consumption (Smith, 1995), price does not always 
have a deterrent effect on destination choice. As tourism purchases are hedonic 
purchases, since they are inherently enjoyable and associated with pleasure during or 
after consumption (Patrick and Park, 2006), Morrison (1996) indicates that this 
underlying hedonic character found in the consumption of tourism products may imply 
that high prices do not always act against demand; rather that the concept of value for 
money, which compares the amount spent with the quality of installations and service, 
takes over. In fact, value for money has been shown to be critical in different areas of 
tourism such as competitiveness (Stevens, 1992), repurchase behaviour (Petrick et al. 
2001; Petrick and Backman, 2002; Petrick, 2004; Chen and Tsai, 2007; He and Song, 
2009), tourist satisfaction (Chen and Tsai, 2008), intention to return (Alegre and 
Cladera, 2008) and perceived relationship quality (Moliner et al., 2007). 
Note that, as has been suggested previously, an individual meaningfully absorbs 
the information on prices depending on his/her level of involvement in a product. Once 
people have obtained this information, they put it into an encoding process in which 
they interpret and assign a meaning to a specific price. However, even though they all 
receive the same external stimulus -price-, perceptions of it are changed in the encoding 
process as individuals adapt it to fit an existing set of beliefs (Jacoby and Olson, 1977). 
That is, when people observe the price to visit a destination, information acquired in the 
past makes it likely that some will interpret the price as being expensive while others 
will consider it to be inexpensive. This process of adapting the price to fit an existing set 
of beliefs leads to different psychological evaluations of it, the central construct being 
the reference price (Assael, 1995; Kim and Crompton, 2002), since it establishes a 
reference point for the evaluation: it is the internally held standard that people use to 
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evaluate new price information. These arguments build on the idea that preferences are 
reference-dependent and they give rise to loss aversion. Next, we briefly describe this 
property. 
2.3. Loss aversion in tourism 
There is considerable evidence from marketing supporting the notion that price 
is composed of not only the retail price itself, but that reference prices are also critical in 
the formation of price perceptions (Winer, 1986). Reference prices have been shown to 
have a consistent and statistically significant impact on consumer demand (Erdem et al., 
2001). That is, when faced with a price, the consumer compares it with some form of 
comparison standard, i.e. the reference price; and this comparison leads consumers to 
perceive a gain if the actual price is less than the reference price, or a loss if the actual 
price is higher than the reference price. 
Loss aversion implies that changes from reference points may be valued 
differently depending on whether they are gains or losses; concretely, people are more 
sensitive to losses relative to their reference point than to gains. In this regard, prospect 
theory predicts that the absolute level of the change in demand due to a loss is greater 
than the corresponding impact of an equal gain. In practical terms, this “loss aversion” 
property has important implications in markets in which individuals manifest 
themselves as loss averse: given that their final choice is greatly influenced by it, 
organizations can develop actions based on this phenomenon (e.g. implementing 
activities to modify their reference points). 
Loss aversion has been theoretically and experimentally demonstrated, but the 
empirical results on the relative size of loss aversion are not consistent (Klapper et al, 
2005). For instance, Hardie et al. (1993) find evidence of loss aversion while 
Kalyanaram and Little (1994) find no significant loss aversion in their respective 
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applications. Some authors argue that this inconsistency can be the result of not 
adequately accounting for consumers’ heterogeneity in their response, as studies that do 
not incorporate heterogeneity into their modelling may provide an upward biased 
estimate for loss aversion. This has been empirically demonstrated by Bell and Lattin 
(2000) and Klapper et al. (2005). 
In tourism, the analysis of loss aversion is especially relevant as the increased 
promotional activity by competing destinations is likely to raise price elasticities 
(Crouch, 1994), even more so considering the high-risk nature of the tourism industry, 
in which a price reduction aimed at getting a rival’s market share might provoke a 
hostile repricing reaction (Cooper et al., 2008). Note that an excessive reduction in 
prices could lower tourists’ reference prices down to levels in which subsequent 
increases could be highly damaging to demand. However, despite its importance, tourist 
loss aversion has been analyzed sparingly: Oh (2003) analyzes room prices of a specific 
upscale hotel operating in a US city and estimates the reference prices by the average 
value of: i) the fair rate suggested by the sample individuals for the room in which they 
are staying and ii) the mean market room rate for hotels like the sample hotel (also 
estimated by the sample individuals). This author does not find evidence that 
asymmetric effects of price deviations exist in individual’s judgments of price 
perceptions. Kim and Crompton (2002) base their study on reference prices, but do not 
estimate them. They operationalize the perceptions of the admission price to a Texas 
state park by asking sample visitors whether a specific admission fee is “much too low, 
too low, about right, too high, much too high” and recoding them on a five-point ordinal 
scale. They use this measure as the dependent variable of a regression model to find the 
independent variables that have an influence on it. Their main result is that economic 
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factors were better explanatory variables for perceptions of admission price than 
behavioural factors. 
Therefore, on account of the relevant role prices play in this type of product, this 
article tests for differentiated loss aversion in the context of a high-involvement non-
frequently purchased hedonic product, depending on the type of channel -direct vs. 
indirect-. Specifically, we hypothesize that consumers buying high-involvement, non-
frequently purchased hedonic products like tourism packages are less loss averse when 
using an intermediary than when dealing with each tourist product provider separately 
(hotel, airline, etc.) and booking their services independently. It implies that they will be 
more willing to accept a higher than expected price; in other words, the negative effect 
of finding a price higher than their reference price is lower when tour operators and 
travel agencies are involved. As stated previously, retailing has singular characteristics 
that affect pricing in a competitive environment (Kopalle et al, 2009), providing an 
array of services, such as location, information, assortment, delivery and ambience 
(Betancourt, 2004). These benefits are even more important when it comes to services 
since, according to the literature (Sweeney et al., 1999), retail service quality plays a 
crucial role in the creation of value perceptions (remember the reduction in the 
uncertainty ever inherent in tourism packages). Therefore, intermediaries are expected 
to provide extra value and therefore individuals may be willing to bear some extra price 
(Kopalle et al., 2009). Note that, if this hypothesis is not rejected, it could be taken as 
identifying consumer-based added value provided by the intermediaries. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1. Modelling approach 
For the analysis of the loss aversion property in a two-facet context -with and 
without intermediaries-, we follow Bell and Latin (2000) and Klapper et al. (2005), so 
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that the utility function Uint for alternative i and individual n on occasion t is expressed 
as 
( ) intintintint ελβα +++= LOSSGAINU nni  (1) 
Rearranging and specifying γn=βnλn 
intintintint εγβα +++= LOSSGAINU nni  (2) 
where, RPnt is the reference price for individual n on occasion t and PRICEit is the 
actual price of alternative i on occasion t, GAINint and LOSSint are defined as follows: 
GAINint=(RPnt- PRICEit)D1, where D1=1 if RPnt- PRICEit>0  and D1=0 otherwise. 
LOSSint=(RPnt- PRICEit)D2, where D2=1 if RPnt- PRICEit<0  and D2=0 otherwise. Note 
that the prices of all alternatives are compared to a common reference price RPnt for 
each individual, as each person has one reference point for all the alternatives (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1991). Finally, αi,γn, βn, λn are coefficients to be estimated and εint is a 
random term.  
Loss aversion will be detected if λn>1 or if γn/βn>1; i.e. if the parameter 
associated with losses is greater than the parameter related to gains. Squared variables 
are added to control for diminishing sensitivity; thereby equation (2) becomes: 
int
2
intint
2
intintint εηγζβα +++++= LOSSLOSSGAINGAINU nnnni  (3) 
Since our objective is to detect different degrees of loss aversion depending on 
whether intermediaries are used or not, in order to reflect potential changes in the 
effects of LOSSint and 2intLOSS  we introduce two dummy variables: TIn=1 if the 
individual uses a travel intermediary and TIn=0 otherwise, and IOTn=1 if the trip is a 
independently organized trip and IOTn=0 otherwise. New parameters ξ1, ξ2, ψ1 and ψ2 
are estimated to capture these changes: 
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++++++= int2int1int2intintint LOSSIOTLOSSTILOSSGAINGAINU nnnnnnni ξξγζβα
int
2
int2
2
int1
2
int εψψη ++++ LOSSIOTLOSSTILOSS nnnnn  (4) 
We assume that εint is a random term that is iid extreme value, which allows us 
to use the Random Parameter Logit Model (RPL). As Bell and Latin (2000) find that a 
model without heterogeneity may provide an upward biased estimate for some 
parameters (in particular, for the loss aversion parameter), we estimate the RPL Model 
because it explicitly models the price response heterogeneity and, in line with Klapper 
et al. (2005), allows us to account for heterogeneity to the fullest possible extent. As it 
leads coefficients θ  to vary over decision makers with density f(θ)) and θ is not 
observable, the probability Pnt(i) of an individual n choosing alternative i on occasion t 
is the integral of Pnt(i/θ) over all the possible values of θ: 
{ }
{ }∫ ∑
=
= θ θθφ dWb
U
U
iP J
j
jnt
nt ),|(
exp
exp
)(
1
int  (5) 
where J is the number of alternatives and φ is the density function of θ, assuming that θ 
is distributed Normal with average b and variance W. 
Also, an advantage of the RPL model is its flexibility, which allows 
representation of different correlation patterns between non-independent alternatives. 
This flexibility avoids the assumption of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA). The traditional multinomial logit model assumes the hypothesis of IIA, which 
supposes the existence of identical correlation patterns and, therefore, proportional 
substitutions across alternatives. In fact, the RPL model does not have the restrictive 
substitution patterns of the Logit model, as the ratio of probabilities Pnt(i)/P nt(j) depends 
on all the data, including the attributes of alternatives other than i and j. Most 
importantly for our study is the fact that this flexibility of the RPL model also allows 
representation of any random utility model (McFadden & Train, 2000). In particular, an 
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RPL model can approximate a Nested Logit (NL), which is appropriate for non-
independent and nested choice alternatives. Following Browstone & Train (1999), the 
RPL model is analogous to an NL model in that it groups the alternatives into nests by 
including a dummy variable in the utility function, which indicates which nest an 
alternative belongs to. In this regard, we include two alternative-specific constants -
coastal and inland constants- in the utility function. 
3.2. Data and Variables 
To reach the objective, we have used information on tourist choice behaviour 
obtained from the national survey “Spanish Holidaying Behaviour (III)”, which was 
carried out by the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. This is due to the 
following reasons: i) The availability of information on individual tourist destination 
choice behaviour in terms of types of destinations, concretely, the types “coastal” and 
“inland”. The examination of destination choices of a “coastal-inland” type is relevant 
because of the tendency of people to look for alternatives to the sun, sea and sand type 
holiday which predominates in countries like Spain. Moreover, the development of 
these alternatives is largely found in inland areas, as it allows a destination typically 
known for its coast to diversify its “product portfolio” as well as revitalising an inland 
economy. In this context, the study of prices is crucial for the development of tourism 
policies by public bodies and for the implementation of strategies in the tourism 
industry. And ii) The survey is directed at a sample (over 18 years old) obtained at each 
individual’s home, which avoids the characteristic selection bias of destination collected 
samples, leading to a more precise analysis of tourist demand. The sample was collected 
through personal, at home, interviews with a structured questionnaire. The original 
sample is of 3,781 individuals, but only 2,127 take holidays. Given that we need 
information on past vacation experiences, by considering individuals who provide 
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information on at least two consecutive holiday periods (regardless of whether they 
went, after the first time, on holiday or not), the final sample size is of 410 individuals. 
Variables. In order to make the choice models operative, we define the variables 
used and identify the dependent and independent variables. 
1) Dependent variables. To represent the set of alternatives (destination types) 
available to the individual, we use the following three dummy variables: i) coastal, 
which takes a value of 1 when this type of destination is chosen and 0 if not; ii) inland, 
where a value of 1 shows that this kind of destination has been selected and 0 if not; iii) 
not going on holiday (at the last vacation occasion), which takes a value of 1 when 
chosen and 0 if not.  
2) Independent Variables. a) Prices. Since the alternatives are “types of 
destinations” (coastal and inland) we have to build a price index for each type. 
Concretely, we measure prices of destination types using the specific cost index for each 
type of destination and each individual proposed by Eymann and Ronning (1997). The 
procedure used to form this index has sometimes been called the “quasi-hedonic” 
regression technique due to its resemblance to the hedonic regression introduced by 
Rosen (1974). In fact, the index proposed by Eymann and Ronning (1997) is an 
application to tourism destinations of the well-known hedonic price index widely used 
in the literature in different fields (Izquierdo and Matea, 2004). It implies following a 
two stage procedure (Eymann and Ronning, 1997): i) a regression model is estimated 
int
)2(
3
)1(
int21int εδδδ +++= ntiii XXE  where Eint are the tourism costs (expenditures) of 
each individual n in each destination type i on occasion t, Xint(1) is the “consumption 
intensity” in the corresponding destination type i based on the number of days the 
individual n spent there on occasion t, and Xnt(2) are the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the individual n on occasion t (household size, marital status, 
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education and income); and ii) the estimated parameters δi1, δi2  and δi3 are used to 
construct the specific cost indices -or quasi-hedonic prices QHPint- for each type of 
destination and each individual at a specific occasion using the expression 
)2(
3
)1(
21int
ˆˆˆ
ntiitii XXQHP δδδ ++=  where )1(itX  represents the average consumption of 
variable Xit(1) in destination i in period t. 
b) Reference prices. In the pricing literature, two types of comparison standards 
have been proposed: i) internal reference price, through which consumers evaluate a 
price by comparing it with price information that is based upon past information. In the 
terminology of Briesch et al (1997), consumers are said to use an internal memory-
based price standard; and ii) external reference price, in which the comparison standard 
is a price -or the current distribution of prices- observed in the shopping environment. In 
this case, consumers are said to utilize a stimulus-based reference price (Briesch et al., 
1997). 
However, it is important to stress that not only are reference price quantities 
generally unavailable from conventional data sources, but they are also difficult to 
measure (Winer, 1986). In fact, Hardie et al. (1993) indicate that the identification of the 
reference point for each consumer is a significant challenge in this modelling context. In 
general terms, in the review carried out by Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) it is 
concluded that many empirical studies have assumed and found that past prices are 
important components of the reference price formation process, thus building 
convincing empirical evidence that past prices are considered when consumers form 
reference prices. In this line, Briesch et al. (1994) compare models with current prices 
(external) and with past prices (internal), finding that the best-fitting model was based 
on the latter. However, based on the price recall data presented by Dickson and Sawyer 
(1990) in their application in a supermarket context, Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) also 
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indicate that consumers are not very likely to clearly remember past prices paid, given 
the number of products purchased in supermarkets. In addition, consumers may also use 
current context-dependent information when building a reference price, such as the 
current price of the last product purchased (Klapper et al, 2005). The current price of the 
last product purchased has been suggested by Bell and Latin (2000) based on the 
argument that it is easier for the consumer to remember the product bought at the last 
purchase occasion than remember the last price paid. 
Given this lack of consensus in the estimation of the reference price, in our 
investigation we develop alternative internal and external reference price concepts. 
Specifically, we formulate one internal reference price and two external reference 
prices. Then, we empirically determine which reference price model, internal (memory-
based) or external (stimulus-based), is best. 
We define the one internal memory-based reference price as the price a 
consumer paid at the last purchase incidence; defined as the occasion previous to the 
current purchase. As stated before, this measure is common in the literature and several 
studies support the use of this internal reference price, such as Mayhew and Winer 
(1992), Klapper et al. (2005) and Mazumdar et al. (2005). We determine the two 
stimulus-based reference prices as: i) the current price of the last product purchased 
(Hardie et al., 1993; Bell and Lattin, 2000), as it is easier for the consumer to remember 
the product bought at the last purchase occasion than remember the last price paid; and 
ii) the average of the current prices of the available alternatives (Rajendran and Tellis, 
1994), as individuals may observe to what extent a price stands out in comparison with 
other product prices. 
Regarding their measurement, the reference prices for the destination types 
coastal and inland are, as in the case of prices, measured using the quasi-hedonic prices 
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of Eymann and Ronning (1997) obtained from the two-stage procedure laid out before 
(of course, for the case of a destination type an individual chose, we use the real 
magnitude paid, both for prices and reference prices). Note that, by employing this 
technique, we are able to estimate the price QHPint for each destination type i, each 
individual n and every purchase occasion t. Therefore, the internal reference price, 
defined as the price a consumer paid at the last purchase incidence, is expressed as 
RPnt= QHPjnt-1, where j is the alternative bought on the last occasion; the external 
reference price, defined as the current price of the last alternative purchased, is 
expressed as RPnt= QHPjnt; and the external reference price, defined as the average of 
the current prices of the available alternatives, is expressed as RPnt= ntQHP . 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to empirically test the best reference price alternative, we estimate -with 
each of them- the model with both linear and squared reference-price-based variables 
(Equation 3). The internal reference price measured by the price paid at the last 
purchase incidence presents the best fit (Log-Likelihood):  
[LL(QHPjnt-1)= -367.59]>[LL( ntQHP )= -390.83]>[LL(QHPjnt )= -405.36] 
This result is in accordance with the wide evidence that the last price paid takes 
part in the formation of the reference price (Briesch et al., 1994; Kalyanaram and 
Winer, 1995; Mazumdar et al. 2005). Having empirically determined that, in this 
application, the internal memory-based reference price is best, we use it to estimate the 
model (Equation 4). 
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the reference-dependent model, 
designed explicitly to examine the effects of gain and loss on individual decisions, in 
which we have introduced the effects of using/not using intermediaries (Equation 4). 
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Note that as a whole, the explanatory ability of Equation 4 outperforms that of Equation 
3 in terms of log-likelihood functions  
[LL(Eq.4)=-319.86>-367.59=LL(Eq.3)] 
as well as Akaike and Schwarz Information Criteria (which control for the number of 
parameters) 
[AIC(Eq.4)=-337.87>-373.59=AIC(Eq.3)] 
[SIC(Eq.4)=-343.38>-375.42=AIC(Eq.3)] 
We observe that the parameter associated with gains is not significantly different 
from zero and the parameter related to losses is significantly positive. The fact that the 
loss parameter is greater than the gain parameter supports the idea that tourists react 
more strongly to price increases than to price decreases relative to the reference price, 
which represents evidence in favour of loss aversion. In real terms, it means that, when 
individuals encounter actual prices above their reference prices, they opt for another 
cheaper alternative. Note that according to the way the loss variable is defined [(RPnt- 
PRICEit) in such a way that RPnt- PRICEit<0], it has a negative sign for alternative i. 
Given that its associated parameter is positive, the effect on the choice of alternative i is 
negative, reducing its value and therefore, increasing the probability of another 
alternative j with a lower price being chosen. 
[Table 1 about here] 
With regard to the gain parameter, it is not significant. This means that the 
positive difference (RPnt- PRICEit) does not have any influence on the selection of 
alternative i. One possible explanation for this result could be that, although some 
individuals can save money when actual prices are below reference prices, some others 
can opt for another more expensive alternative whose price approaches their reference 
price. Therefore, as PRICEit gets closer to RPnt the difference (RPnt- PRICEit) tends to 
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zero, and its impact on the choice of alternative i becomes null. Concerning the squared 
variables, gain2 and loss2, we find that the parameter associated with the former is not 
significantly different from zero and the parameter related to the latter is significantly 
positive. It means that there is diminishing sensitivity for losses, showing convexity for 
these negative values. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As for the use/non-use of travel intermediaries, all the interaction variables are 
statistically significant. However, while the interactions “Loss2 x Tourist Intermediary” 
and “Loss2 x Independently Organized Trip” are significantly different (H0:ψ1=ψ2; 
t=60.61;p-value <0.000), the interactions “Loss x Tourist Intermediary” and “Loss x 
Independently Organized Trip” are not (H0:ξ1=ξ2; t=0.3117;p-value>0.75). 
These results mean that the further the actual price is from the reference price, 
the larger the distance in terms of loss aversion between using and not using tourist 
intermediaries becomes. Figure 1 shows that the difference is imperceptible when the 
prices are close to the reference price, but after a certain point (say, about 20 Euros), 
each line takes a distinct path, implying a stronger reduction in loss aversion when using 
intermediaries, as individuals perceive that extra value is created and provided in terms 
of further services (Kopalle et al, 2009; Sweeney et al., 1999). Conversely, when 
booking independently, consumers become more and more loss averse as the difference 
between actual price and reference price increases. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that tourism intermediaries reduce loss aversion in the context of high-
involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic products. 
To confirm this result, we have to discard the possibility that this outcome 
comes from the fact that less-price sensitive customers could be choosing 
intermediaries. If this were the case, customers using intermediaries would 
 21
systematically select higher-priced products. We conduct several ANOVAs to test 
whether there are differences in prices paid with and without intermediaries. Table 2 
shows the results of the four Anova tests performed and no significant differences are 
found in any case. This reinforces the differentiated loss aversion pattern found. 
Strictly speaking, being less-price sensitive does not necessarily mean that loss 
aversion is going to be lower: it is one thing to “select a high price” and another to 
“select a higher than expected price”. Both sensitive- and insensitive-to-price 
individuals must have reference prices, though, at different levels; therefore, loss 
aversion can exist in both cases. However, it is true that both concepts can be related: 
less sensitive consumers are less affected by higher prices; hence, they could be less 
loss averse. The results of the Anova tests dismiss the possibility of an association 
between “less sensitive individuals and use of intermediaries”; thus, the lower loss 
aversion found is due to the mediating role of intermediaries and not because those 
using intermediaries could be less sensitive. 
Consequently, this result can be taken as identifying consumer-based added 
value provided by the intermediaries. That is, consumers are more predisposed -or are 
less reluctant- to accept higher than expected prices via indirect than via direct channels. 
Based on the persistent claim that retailers have to create value through performance-
delivery elements, this result supports the fact the consumers recognize this added value 
and the differentiation obtained by intermediaries through their extra services. 
For the case of tourism packages, note that it is not just a question of the 
uniquely enriching experiences retailers provide, but a more basic trait emerges: 
retailers help consumers gain trust in a high-involvement product. Remember that the 
“Ropo effect” especially applies to tourism, and this result confirms the travel agents’ 
ability to provide personal information and advice to travellers. That is, these 
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intermediaries reduce the uncertainty derived from the fact that consumers: i) have to go 
to the place where the product is located; ii) cannot assess it before consumption; and 
iii) do not know what they will find during their stay. Therefore, consumers are 
prepared to incur the cost of decreasing this uncertainty. Strictly speaking, they are 
more prepared when using indirect channels; note that the loss aversion property does 
not disappear in either case.  
As a final remark; implicit in the greater loss aversion of direct channels is the 
idea that people are never sure whether they are opting for the optimal price when they 
book on their own without travel advisors; thus, when finding a higher than expected 
price they are more likely to change alternatives when they do not receive any 
professional advice because their doubts about the existence of a more economical price 
become stronger. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has examined the existence of different effects of loss aversion on a 
high-involvement non-frequently purchased hedonic product, depending on whether 
individuals use direct or indirect channels. By incorporating the reference-dependent 
model into a Multinomial Logit Model with Random Parameters, the empirical 
application carried out in Spain shows that people react more strongly to price increases 
than to price decreases relative to the reference price, which represents evidence in 
favour of loss aversion. It implies that, when individuals encounter actual prices above 
their reference prices, they opt for another more economical alternative. 
More importantly, with regard to the differentiated effects on direct and indirect 
channels, we find that consumers buying high-involvement non-frequently purchased 
hedonic products (tourism packages, to be precise) are less loss averse when using an 
intermediary than when dealing with each provider separately and booking their 
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services independently. This means that the negative effect of finding an actual price 
higher than their reference price diminishes when intermediaries take part. The 
uncertainty inherently associated with this type of product makes the extra value added 
by intermediaries especially relevant in reducing information asymmetries, and this 
makes people more likely to accept higher than expected prices when they are offered 
by intermediaries as opposed to individual service providers. In this regard, the key 
implication is that intermediaries can -and should- add value in competition with direct 
e-tailing. 
For destination management, the main implication is as follows: at a time when 
destinations are emphasizing the use of collective brands to promote individual 
destinations under these umbrella brands (such as “sun and sea”, “inland”, “green 
destinations”, “World Heritage destinations”, etc.) , knowing the effect of an increase in 
their prices is crucial; this is especially applicable these days when many destinations 
have lowered prices to attract tourists, knowing that later they will have to put prices 
back up to their normal levels. It is well known that excessive price reductions could 
lower reference prices, and consequently the region of loss aversion would be widened; 
thus, the subsequent price increases could provoke strong negative reactions in demand. 
In this regard, Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) indicate that firms could force people to 
adapt to new higher reference prices by augmenting prices through small increments, in 
such a way that these increments are not fully noticed by individuals. This tactic can be 
implemented more readily by intermediaries as the negative effect of raising prices can 
be absorbed more easily managed less tightly via indirect channels when compared to 
individual providers, as the influence of loss aversion is lower for the former than the 
latter. This result also gives importance to networking on the part of the destinations, as 
promotional activities such as fam-trips and workshops, whose main purpose is to make 
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contacts with intermediaries, are still worthwhile, as the individuals recognize 
consumer-based added value provided by the intermediaries. 
An important limitation of this study comes from the use of secondary 
information sources, as it does not allow us to work with dimensions tailored to our 
investigation. In particular, this limitation prevents us from testing a larger number of 
alternative reference price proposals. As Lattin and Bucklin (1989) suggest, consumer 
reference points are difficult if not impossible to measure directly, and researchers have 
to try several alternatives to capture these constructs indirectly. Although in our study 
we have tested three alternative reference prices -one internal and two external-, we 
cannot use either of the measures suggested by the individual him/herself such as the 
“fair price” or some stimuli-based reference prices such as those appearing in brochures 
or advertising because they were not available to us. 
The analysis is made on the two most important types of destination for 
Mediterranean countries like Spain -coast and inland-, and its findings are restricted to 
them. That is, the article shows that a differentiated loss aversion exists, but other kinds 
of destination could be tested to overcome this major limitation and enrich the findings. 
In particular, Mediterranean countries with destinations that are awarded the distinction 
of “World Heritage City” by UNESCO could add a third alternative to see whether loss 
aversion changes with respect to coastal and inland destinations. Also, as Roper (2005) 
finds that the standardization of marketing tactics in an international realm is affected 
by type of product and industry characteristics, other countries, such as those of Central 
Europe, with a different pattern of types of destination, can analyze destinations defined 
according to their urban character -city vs. village-. 
Three important avenues for further research stand out: Firstly, note that our 
analysis focuses on types of destinations and certainly this way of working allows us to 
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find the influence of prices and reference prices in a general manner, but we are not able 
to get knowledge of their impact on a particular destination. Therefore, a thread of 
future research could be oriented towards analyzing specific destinations in order to 
observe the asymmetric effects of price response, in such a way that rivalry analyses 
could be carried out destination-by-destination and by type of purchase -direct vs. 
indirect-. For example, within a country, it would imply analyzing different destinations 
according to their prices and the way tourists have booked. Secondly, having shown that 
decisions are determined by asymmetric price response effects and that these effects 
change depending on the direct-indirect character of the purchase, and as these 
decisions determine market shares, it is important to note that the inclusion of loss 
aversion in competition models could shed some light on the analysis of competitors’ 
actions and reactions. Specifically, as González-Benito et al. (2005) show, the concept 
of store format plays a prominent role in the relationship between market share and 
spatial competition; thus, it may be relevant to analyze the different ways loss aversion 
is manifested in distinct store formats with regard to these high-involvement non-
frequently purchased hedonic products; e.g. is the loss aversion effect for purchases in 
city centre travel agencies different to its effect on those in hypermarkets?. Thirdly, in 
line with the development agencies’ purpose of generating tourism from events (Stokes, 
2006), it could be relevant to look into a potential differentiated loss aversion according 
to the way people make reservations. 
The main idea we can derived from the results is that: given that intermediaries 
reduce loss aversion in the context of a high-involvement non-frequently purchased 
hedonic product such as tourism packages, tourism intermediaries are considered to 
provide consumer-based added value. Therefore, they have to look for this valuable 
provision and make clients trust their service. 
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Table 1. Effects of gains and losses using/not using intermediaries 
Independent Variables b t-statistic SD of β t-statistic 
Gain 0.0059829
 
(0.0235776) 0.2537520 
0.0596199 
(0.0686404) 0.8685833 
Gain2 -0.0000059
 
(0.0000494) -0.1189222 
0.0001228 
(0.0001496) 0.8211540 
Loss 0.0804259
 
(0.0192170) 4.1851445 
0.0002799 
(0.0003584) 0.7809117 
Loss x Tourist Intermediary -0.0581978
 
(0.0199353) -2.9193297 
0.0009420b 
(0.0003102) 3.0371111 
Loss x Independently Organized Trip -0.0683152
 
(0.0189252) -3.6097552 
0.0001113 
(0.0003298) 0.3373658 
Loss2 0.0002010
 
(0.0000553) 3.6373507 
0.0000003 
(0.0000014) 0.2262774 
Loss2 x Tourist Intermediary -0.0001143
 
(0.0000624) -1.8328789 
0.0000012 
(0.0000022) 0.5437788 
Loss2 x Independently Organized Trip -0.0001801
 
(0.0000549) -3.2809255 
0.0000006 
(0.0000008) 0.7466667 
Coastal Constant 1.5126352
 
(0.2514217) 6.0163270 - - 
Inland Constant 1.5200900
 
(0.3201473) 4.7480959 - - 
Log-likelihood -319.8658 
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Table 2. Price Differences between direct and indirect channels  
(by types of products and through occasions) 
 Average price paid (t-1) Average price paid (t) 
 Coastal Destination Inland Destination Coastal Destination Inland Destination 
Anova’s F test 
(p-value) 
0.163  
(0.687) 
0.155  
(0.694) 
0.683  
(0.409) 
1.671  
(0.197) 
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Figure 1. Differentiated effects of loss aversion in direct and indirect purchases 
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